We examine the incentives for a government to levy an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist with unknown costs. With complete information, the home government uses a discriminatory tariffs policy to extract rents. If the government is incompletely informed about costs, we show that under reasonable conditions the unique equilibrium involves pooling where the firm exports the same quantity regardless of its efficiency. We find that in general home welfare is higher under alternative policies such as uniform tariffs or free trade, suggesting that trade policies that are motivated by rent extraction are unlikely to be robust to the introduction of incomplete information.
Introduction
The insight that a small positive tariff will cause a welfare-improving terms of trade effect is one of the fundamental explanations for the existence of trade 1 restrictions. Even though the standard analysis is conducted within a perfectly competitive framework (Johnson, 1951) , the incentive to use trade policy to manipulate the terms of trade emerges in a variety of market structures and 2 technologies.
The economics underlying the terms of trade effect is perhaps most clearly stated when the domestic market is serviced by a foreign monopolist (Katrak, 1977; Brander and Spencer, 1984) . If demand is not too convex, a small positive tariff will cause the price of the product to rise by less than the full amount of the tariff. On net, the loss in consumer surplus is more than compensated by the gain in tariff revenue. Hwang and May (1991) further develop Katrak's (1977) insight and show that the size of the tariff is directly related to the efficiency of the foreign supplier: the more efficient is the monopolist, the larger is the optimal 3 tariff. Hwang and May's analysis suggests that the often observed deviations from uniform tariff levels are due at least in part to the government's desire to fine-tune their tariff structure to the exporter's efficiency. That is, exceptions will be sought against efficient suppliers (i.e., high tariffs such as antidumping and countervailing duties); on the other hand, custom unions or preferential trading arrangements (i.e., NAFTA and the Caribbean Basin Initiative) will be formed with countries whose firms are relatively inefficient.
A key assumption implicit in a model of discriminatory tariffs is that the government has complete information about, or is able to observe, the technology of the foreign supplier. If the government cannot observe costs, then the terms of trade incentive to deviate from uniform tariffs may disappear. The reason is that the foreign firm has an incentive to alter its exporting behavior in order to convince the government that it is an inefficient firm. And, if the foreign firm always acts as if it is inefficient, a discriminatory tariff policy leads to uniform low tariffs. On the other hand, an explicit commitment to a uniform policy would have similar terms of trade effects, but without distorting the incentives for the monopolist to trade.
Thus, the main question we address in this paper is whether a policy of discriminatory tariffs makes sense for a government with incomplete information 1 There are many other explanations for the widespread use of trade restrictions, including rent-seeking, political pressures Helpman, 1994, 1995a,b) , increasing returns to scale (Krugman, 1984) , and profit-shifting motives (Brander and Spencer, 1984) .
2 Feenstra (1995) offers an excellent summary of the terms of trade driven incentives for trade restrictions in both perfectly and imperfectly competitive models. Bagwell and Staiger (1996) argue that the terms of trade effect explains not only why tariffs are levied but also why unilateral liberalization (beyond the Nash tariff level) is rarely observed. They argue that the desire to escape from terms of trade driven prisoners' dilemma is the primary reason why countries enter into reciprocal trade agreements.
3 While the idea of imposing duties as a function of the efficiency of a foreign exporter is implicit in the optimum tariff arguments of Katrak (1977) , Hwang and May (1991) were the first to explicitly develop the result, albeit in a duopoly setting. about the foreign firm. In order to answer this question, we develop a multi-period model where the foreign firm's efficiency is private information. In the first period foreign products are allowed to enter at a pre-existing tariff level. Upon observing the firm's first period exports, the government levies a tariff on future period trade. From a technical viewpoint, the model is essentially a signaling game where we seek to determine whether the outcome involves pooling or separation and whether in light of the signaling problem a discriminatory policy is superior to a commitment to uniform tariffs.
There are several key findings. First, we show that there is always a unique stable Nash equilibrium. In particular, we show that the type of equilibrium to emerge-separating or pooling-depends on the size of the discount rate (relative to cost and demand parameters). If the discount rate is sufficiently large, pooling is the unique equilibrium; on the hand, if the discount rate is relatively small, separation is the unique equilibrium. Second, we show that a policy of discriminatory tariffs will typically lower welfare, suggesting that the welfare results of Katrak (1977) , Brander and Spencer (1984) and Hwang and May (1991) depend crucially on the assumption of full information. Specifically, we show that a policy of uniform tariffs is always preferred whenever the discount rate is sufficiently large to result in pooling and is usually preferred when separation is the unique equilibrium. Third, our model highlights the importance of the 'single crossing' assumption which is typically made in signaling models. We show that our model falls into the category of signaling games with 'double crossing' as defined by Kolev (1995) . By double crossing we mean that the payoff function of the party with private information does not satisfy the usual monotonicity with respect to type. As a result the typically observed separating equilibria are rather fragile and the unique self-enforcing outcome is likely to involve pooling where exports are restricted regardless of the true type of the foreign firm.
Our paper complements a growing body of work incorporating incomplete information in strategic trade policy models, all of which in one from or another draw into question the robustness of benefits of rent extraction policies. The papers of Qiu (1994) and Hviid (1993, 1994) are the most closely related to the signaling approach developed in this paper. The first two papers use third market models in which a foreign firm is incompletely informed about the costs of a domestic producer. Qiu's (1994) model is a combination of screening and signaling, where he shows that a separation-inducing menu must involve subsidies proportional to efficiency. Collie and Hviid (1993) show that governments have an incentive to oversubsidize exports in order to signal the domestic firm's efficiency and soften foreign competition. In a model with a foreign monopolist who has incomplete information about domestic demand, Collie and Hviid (1994) show that the unique separating equilibrium involves excessive duties. All of these models are characterized by the usual single crossing property and thus all result in separating outcomes. Our analysis highlights the relevance of pooling outcomes. More recently, Brainard and Martimort (1997) have extended the basic Brander-Spencer duopoly game to allow both firms to have private information and to allow both governments to strategically use trade policy. They adopt a screening approach and find that the informational asymmetry reduces the optimal subsidy (and may even imply that an export tax is optimal).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is developed, and in Section 3 we solve for the benchmark complete information discriminatory tariff. In Section 4 we solve for the optimal tariff under incomplete information and show how the discount factor crucially influences the equilibrium outcome. In Section 5 we analyze the welfare consequences of government's limited information. Concluding comments and extensions are discussed in Section 6.
The basic model
We assume that there is a single multinational firm who serves the domestic market. The sequence of moves in the game we have in mind is as follows. At time zero the constant marginal cost of the foreign firm is drawn from the set # 5 hc ,c j, c , c , according to a commonly known probability distribution. Let l h l h m be the probability that the monopolist is efficient (i.e., has cost c ). The true l realization of the draw is private information for the exporter. The assumption of constant marginal costs is convenient since it allows for an independent analysis of the export decision. Exporting takes place over an infinite number of periods. In the first period the 4 firm chooses a quantity from the positive orthant under conditions of free trade. After observing the level of imports the government forms beliefs about the type of firm servicing its market and selects a per unit tariff, t. We limit the ability of the government to intertemporally change its policy by assuming that the tariff will be in effect for the remainder of the game. Given the chosen tariff, in each period the multinational makes its output decision and payoffs are realized. We work with the standard model of Katrak (1977) where q , the demand for t the imported product in period t in the home country, is derived from a quasi-linear utility function which yields an inverse aggregate demand function of the form p 5 a 2 q , t 5 1, . . . ,`.
t t
The complete information tariff
In order to highlight the distortions caused by asymmetric information, we begin by examining the optimal tariff when the home government has full information about the firm's costs. In period t, t$2, the multinational takes t as given. Its variable profit function can be written as p 5 q (a 2 q ) 2 tq 2 c q , t 5 2, . . . ,`, 
Since maximizing total welfare (post-tariff) is equivalent to maximizing per period welfare we can substitute the firm's unique best quantity response, q (t), into Eq.
Maximizing Eq. (3) with respect to t yields an optimal tariff of
i i
The equilibrium tariff, which is the same as the one obtained by Katrak (1977) , shows the clear incentive for the home country to exploit its information and levy a tariff proportionate to the efficiency of the exporter. Given that the government observes realized costs, the firm's optimal first o period decision is to simply sell the monopoly output, q 5(a2c ) / 2. This implies 1i i the firm's total profit (over all periods) is 2 (a 2 c ) (9 2 5d )
Tariff policy with incomplete information
We now return to the assumption that the government does not observe the firm's cost realization. By introducing private information on the part of the firm we explore the possibility that the producer can act strategically in the first period in order to influence the posterior beliefs and the subsequent choice of tariff by the government. A deviation from the monopoly level of output is costly and it can serve as a natural credible signal which the firm can employ to transmit information about its technology. From Eq. (3) note that ≠W/ ≠t is strictly decreasing in c . This means that the benefit of the home country from lowering the tariff rate is strictly increasing in cost which in turn implies that the government's best response function is strictly decreasing in the posterior likelihood of h. And, from the analysis of the prior section it is evident that the exporter would like the government to believe that it is inefficient so that it faces lower duties.
The solution concept
We restrict our attention to sequential equilibria in the sense of Kreps and Wilson (1982) as adapted to signaling games with continuum of strategies by Kreps and Sobel (1994) . In short, sequential equilibria require that: (i) both players maximize their respective payoff functions given the strategy of the other and the beliefs of the government (sequential rationality); and (ii) the set of posterior beliefs at each quantity level rationalizes the government's behavior in a manner compatible with Bayes' theorem at non-null events (consistency).
It is obvious that in any sequential equilibrium the firm will choose the monopoly level of exports and earn the corresponding profit in each period following the imposition of the tariff. If the state is able to correctly infer the technology and impose its optimal tariff, the best the monopolist can do is (substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (1) (a 2 c )/2 t 5 1,
It is also easy to show that, as usual in signaling games, there is a continuum of pooling, semi-pooling, and separating equilibria due to the wide range of permissible beliefs about the type of the monopolist which the government may entertain off a sequential equilibrium path. Most of these systems of beliefs are unreasonable, however, and we will further refine the set of sequential equilibria by employing the D criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) which is based on the 1 notion of divinity of Banks and Sobel (1987) . In essence, this requires the government to place probability one on the type more likely to produce a particular out of equilibrium quantity. To formalize the idea, let us fix a sequential equilibrium outcome (i.e., a probability distribution over the end points of the game induced by a sequential equilibrium) in which an exporter of type i obtains * total profit p . For an out of equilibrium quantity q define the set
where BR(h, q ) is the set of best responses of the government at q given that the 1 1 0 induced beliefs about the types exporting this quantity are h. E (q ) is thus the set i 1 of best responses which would leave i indifferent between his equilibrium strategy and exporting q . Likewise, the set of sequentially rational tariffs which would 1 make i strictly better off is denoted by
We say that a sequential equilibrium is D if and only if, at each off equilibrium 1 quantity q , it can be supported with beliefs h(iuq )50 whenever
An outcome arising from a D equilibrium will be termed a D i 9 1 1 1 outcome. The intuition behind the divinity refinement is that whenever i wants to deviate from a particular equilibrium, i9 also does, which makes i9 the more likely type to break the proposed play.
As is well known, there are a number of refinements of equilibria used in signaling games. Similar to the D criterion in both intuition and game theory 1 justification are the Intuitive Criterion and the D criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) . 
In our case, since we only have two types the D and D concepts are equivalent.
1 2
On the other hand, the Intuitive Criterion is a weaker refinement than D . At an 1 out of equilibrium quantity q9, the Intuitive Criterion requires assigning probability one to a given type i if in combination with the lowest possible sequentially rational tariff q9 is: (1) preferred by i to the proposed equilibrium; and (2) is not preferred to the proposed equilibrium by the other type. However, the Intuitive Criterion does not provide a systematic way to assign beliefs if at q9 both types prefer the lowest tariff to the proposed equilibrium. It is well known that if there are two types and if the profit function of the monopolist exhibits the single crossing property, then no pooling equilibria survive the Intuitive Criterion. In fact, the Intuitive Criterion selects the unique self-chosen actions by both players will be strictly positive. An isoprofit curve for a monopolist of type i, which represents the combinations of quantities q and tariffs 1 t yielding the same profit, p , is implicitly given by
We now prove that our game falls into the subclass of signaling games with double crossing (all proofs are in Appendix A).L Lemma 1 states that the incentives for the two types to deviate from a given outcome differ depending on the relative sizes of t and q . Consider first the case 1 when q .t/ 2 (i.e., relatively high quantity levels). This case is depicted 1 graphically by point B in Fig. 2 (and also by point D in Fig. 3 ). Note that as graphed the firms' preferred set lies to the south of the isoprofit curves-for a given quantity, profit increases as the tariff falls. At the point of intersection (B) the slope of isoprofit curve for the efficient type (type l) is bigger than the slope of inefficient type's isoprofit curve. This relationship can simply be interpreted as implying that at B an increase in exports by l is more profitable than an increase by h.
Consider the other case, when q ,t/ 2. This case is depicted by the point C in 1 Fig. 3 . At the point of intersection the slope of the isoprofit curve for the efficient type is smaller than the inefficient type's-implying that at C an increase in exports by l is less profitable than an increase by h. Finally, if the two isoprofit curves have a point in common along the locus t 52q , they must be tangent at that point. This case is depicted by the point E in 1 Fig. 4 and will be discussed at greater length in Section 4.4.
Incentives to distort first period trade
In this section we would like to investigate l's incentives to change its first period behavior in order to receive a more favorable tariff. If l is not able to conceal its type, the optimal behavior involves producing its monopoly level, .
In order to characterize the incentives for l to distort its trade, we construct the complete information isoprofit curve which is the locus of quantity-tariff pairs in
This isoprofit curve is depicted in Fig. 2 
Division by (a2c ) yields
where we have used a measure of the relative cost differential between the two types
. 1. (10) a 2 c h Solving Eq. (9) for d, it is straightforward to show that for all From this point on we will assume m that the mimicking condition is satisfied. In Fig. 1 we graph d . The mimicking condition would be violated if d is sufficiently small in comparison with the difference in marginal costs. In this case, the reduction in the efficient type's (l) output in order to imitate the high cost producer is unacceptable given the low weight on future profits.
An important concern is not just whether for a given set of parameter values the isoprofit curves 'double cross' but also whether double crossing affects what As we will now show, when d #d ,d the unique stable equilibrium of the game is separating, i.e., those where each type exports a distinct quantity in the first period with probability one. In any such situation the true types are revealed and if this is to be a sequential equilibrium outcome, the efficient firm (type l) s must produce its monopoly level. Hence, his separating equilibria profit will be p l and the separating equilibria isoprofit curve will be given by Eq. (8).
It is easy to check that the incentive constraint Eq. (8) 
For every export level q [S we have p ,p (q , t ). Therefore, in any pure we must also check for the existence of pooling equilibria.
From Eq. (7) it is obvious that the isoprofit curve depends critically on d. As we will show, this fact combined with Lemma 1 will imply different equilibrium outcomes of the game for different values of d.
It is straightforward to show that any isoprofit curve can cross the tangency 9 9 9
locus at most once. Formally, p (q 5t9 /2, t9)$p (q , t) implies p (q 5t0 / 2, In order to compact the strategy spaces of the players we will assume that a type which is indifferent between its proposed equilibrium action and another quantity will follow the former. that of games which satisfy the standard single crossing property, allowing us now to claim that no pooling equilibrium outcome can survive the D criterion. Then it must be that q 5t /2, and ;q ±q , p (q , t )5p (q , t) and p (q , The unique D equilibrium outcome when the prior guarantees the existence of 1 a mixed pool is depicted in Fig. 4 . Note that in order to clearly highlight the fact that the isoprofit curves are tangent we have drawn l's isoprofit curve using a thicker line.
Proposition 5 is the key result of the paper. If a government does not have complete information about the foreign monopolist's costs, a policy of discriminatory tariffs will not be successfully implemented whenever the discount rate is sufficiently large. This significantly weakens the policy, since the government can simply levy a uniform tariff ex ante without causing any output distortions.
Moreover, Fig. 1 Both of these conditions are significantly more difficult to achieve than the thresholds sufficient for pooling to emerge as a D equilibrium.
The prior probability of l should be sufficiently large so that t .2q , where 1h e o o t ;mt 1(12m)t is the ex ante optimal tariff. In particular, it must be that l h
m .2/(A21).
It seems unlikely for this unusual result (that h's exports increase in the pool) to hold. In addition, independent of h's output relative to its complete information monopoly level, the welfare analysis below shows that in general discriminatory tariff protection lowers welfare relative to uniform tariff.
Welfare implications of incomplete information
We would now like to determine whether a policy of discriminatory tariffs raises expected welfare. As shown in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 the equilibrium under In looking for a suitable benchmark for comparison, we consider two commonly observed alternatives: a uniform tariff and free trade. As compared to either benchmark a discriminatory policy involves costly output distortions and often lower welfare.
Uniform tariff benchmark
Consider a scenario where the home country can precommit itself to a uniform tariff. This alternative scenario is plausible if there are bilateral or multilateral trade arrangements which prevent the importing country from raising its tariff in later periods. This would credibly remove the possibility for differential tariff treatment and hence eliminate the incentives of the exporting firm to signal its technology through quantity restraints.
Assuming the uniform tariff is designed in order to maximize expected welfare, using Eq. (3) we can show the optimal tariff is U t 5 m(a 2 c )/3 1 (1 2 m)(a 2 c )/3. ] periods. Using our measure of the relative cost differential, the difference in welfare is While not written explicitly, it is important to recall that d and d are functions of A. 9 This scenario would become exceedingly likely the larger is the discount rate. 
We can now summarize our discussion as follows,P 
Free trade benchmark
Many economists believe that independently of GATT, free trade is a policy that a government can commit more easily to than a uniform tariff. For this reason, we now consider how the pure pooling outcome compares to free trade. We will show that for a substantial range of the parameter space free trade is the preferred policy. This result is quite remarkable when one considers the standard rent extraction motives for levying tariffs in this model. Free trade involves sacrificing many periods of tariff revenue and the fact that it may nonetheless be preferred highlights the potential costs of discriminatory tariff policy under incomplete information.
Using our measure of the relative cost differential and substituting into Eq. (3), the difference in welfare is One can easily verify that C increases in d, implying that free trade becomes less desirable as the discount factor rises. This makes sense because the pooling outcome generates a stream of tariff revenue and this revenue becomes increasingly important as d rises. 
Conclusion
The model developed here highlights an issue often ignored in the literature on optimal tariff regimes: the desire of importing countries to discriminate on the basis of foreign monopolist's technology is likely to provoke an undesirable strategic reaction by the monopolist in the form of reduced trade. Typically, the equilibria in signaling games involve separation and hence only the player with attractive information alters its behavior. In our model this would mean that only the firm with high costs would reduce exports relative to their profit maximizing level. This is the case when the discount rate is relatively small. However, when the discount rate is relatively large the unique outcome involves pooling where exports are restricted regardless of the true type of the foreign firm. Our analysis shows that incomplete information makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to implement a policy of discriminatory tariffs and highlights the difficulties in making clear-cut policy recommendations when faced with the unavoidable ambiguity associated with pooling equilibrium. Given this, we show that a policy of optimal uniform tariffs is generally superior to one of discriminatory tariffs. The results from this paper complement other recent work on trade policy with incomplete information in two important ways. First, we adopt a signaling approach to model the government's informational asymmetry while most of the other literature uses a screening approach. Second, we emphasize the relevance of pooling outcomes while the other research in this area emphasizes separation. Taken together this body of work severely draws into question the welfare benefits of trade policies aimed at rent extraction.
Also, we believe an important methodological contribution of the paper is the description of double crossing property of the payoff function. We show that this phenomenon gives rise to a pooling outcome. We hope that our analysis will lead other researchers to question the plausibility of separating equilibria when single crossing is not satisfied.
Finally, we note a few extensions. First, the unique stable pooling equilibrium outcome can be arrived at in other reasonable ways, not just through our assumption that the tariff is in place for many periods. Any factor that increases the marginal impact of tariffs on the exporter's payoff decreases the likelihood of pure strategy separating equilibria. For instance, consider a model where there are only two periods, one before the tariff is levied and one after. If demand grows over time then one can show that the unique equilibrium is the same as that derived in Section 4.4. Second, one can alternatively view the government's objective as maximizing tariff revenue only. It is straightforward to show that this again makes pooling more likely and hence exacerbates the welfare consequences. Third, the qualitative features of the model remain similar if we consider a foreign duopoly or if we allow for domestic production. The latter model is of significant practical interest since the attempt to tariff discriminate among exporters is not feasible under the MFN clause of the WTO. The presence of domestic production serves as an excuse for the proliferation of contingent measures of protection such as antidumping duties. The introduction of additional strategic players adds some new aspects to the interactions without altering the results significantly. 
and because this condition holds the D criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) requires 1 9 the beliefs of the receiver to place probability one on h at q . This would clearly 1 make h defect from the equilibrium we set out to check.
*
As the same reasoning applies to all q ±q it follows that the unique candidate and the second part of the lemma follows. The first part follows from Eq. (A.1) in conjunction with monotonicity (the payoff of the monopolist is strictly decreasing in t). In particular, any two isoprofit curves can cross at most once in any of the two half-spaces defined by the tangency locus, t 52q . h 1
Proof of Proposition 2
Note first that the incentive compatible constraint Eq. (8) for l implies that the only possible levels of exports which can arise in a sequential pooling equilibrium must be in S.
*
Suppose that both types export with positive probability quantity q in the first 
]

Proof of Proposition 4
The claim, as we noted, is equivalent to proving that q is not a D strategy for under t 5t , ;q , the equilibrium payoff for h must be strictly higher than l 1 o producing any q in combination with t .
1 l
*
The above description of the equilibrium isoprofit curves implies that ;q ±q :
Hence in a D equilibrium the beliefs of the government at q ±q must place 1 1 1 o probability one on l and the corresponding tariff should be t . This would make h l * export q with probability one.
1 Suppose now that the prior probability of an l-type exporter, m, is such that p $p (q 5t /2, t ), where t 5mt 1(12m)t is the ex ante optimal tariff.
We claim that in this case l can not pool with probability one in any sequential equilibrium. This follows from the fact that if l pools with probability one, then e e e the unique best response of the government would be t to the quantity q 5t / 2. The point (q , t ) is strictly inferior for l compared to full separation at q . This 1l e implies that l can not pool with probability one at q . Therefore, the only possibility for a solution must involve partial pooling.
As argued above, in any D pooling equilibrium all disequilibrium tariffs will be 1 o t . The strict concavity of l's profit function will then guarantee that the only l o quantity produced with positive probability and met with t is the unique l o maximizer, q . Moreover, the payoff from such an action must be equal to the 1l payoff at the pooled message if l is to randomize. This implies that the pool must occur at the point of intersection of l's complete information isoprofit curve Eq. p (7) and the tangency locus. Call this quantity q . In order to make the In other words, the probability r with which l plays q should determine its 1 p conditional probability given q through outcome for the case when p $p (q 5t / 2, t ).
On the other hand, if p ,p (q 5t /2, t ), then l would rather pool at l l 1 e e q 5t / 2 than separate. The partial pooling equilibrium described in the preceding paragraph is not even sequential in this case since the posterior h would require l p to export q with probability larger than one (keep in mind that in any pooling D 1 1 equilibrium h must pool with probability one). This shows that the only D 1 e e equilibrium is in pure strategies at exports q and tariff level t . The offo e equilibrium response is t , ;q ±q . h l 1
